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Marshall Klavan headed theObstetrics and GynecologyDepartment of the Crozer-
Chester Medical Center.1 He deeply
feared strokes, perhaps because his fa-
ther had been savaged by one. In 1993,
Dr. Klavan wrote an advance directive
which said that (as a court later put it)
“he ‘absolutely did not want any extra-
ordinary care measures utilized by
health care providers.’”
On April 29, 1997, Dr. Klavan tried
to kill himself. He left suicide notes and
a note refusing resuscitation. The next
morning, medical center employees
found him unconscious and took him
to the emergency room, where he was
resuscitated. By May 2, Dr. Klavan had
fallen into a persistent vegetative state.
His family and his lawyer told the cen-
ter about his notes and his advance di-
rective. On May 4, the center “agreed to
provide care in accordance with” the ad-
vance directive, but on May 5 Dr. Kla-
van’s condition worsened and the center
again resuscitated him. He “then suf-
fered a stroke that rendered him men-
tally and physically incompetent.”
A suit was brought on Dr. Klavan’s
behalf in federal court. It claimed that
his fourteenth amendment right to
refuse medical treatment was being de-
nied. The fourteenth amendment, how-
ever, restricts only governments, not
private institutions. Had the govern-
ment so deeply implicated itself in the
center’s activities that it had effectively
become a governmental institution?
The court thought not, leaving Dr. Kla-
van’s representative only with state-law
claims. The federal court had discretion
to take jurisdiction of those claims, but
it refused: “While Dr. Klavan’s situation
cries out for prompt and definitive judi-
cial resolution, we nevertheless decline
to exercise our discretion . . . precisely
because of the gravity of his case.”
How did this sad case reach this un-
settling result? First, the story I have
told may be false.2 Klavan was decided
before a trial could determine what had
actually happened. To decide whether it
had jurisdiction, the court accepted as
true everything Dr. Klavan’s representa-
tive had alleged. The court concluded
that even if all the allegations were true,
it should not grant the relief Dr. Kla-
van’s representative sought. Therefore
we have no idea what the medical cen-
ter’s defense was or how any factual dis-
putes would have been resolved in a
trial. (And even had there been a trial,
we could not be sure of its conclusions.)
More broadly, however, the Klavan
court’s reluctance to address the dispute
was typical of the judicial reaction to
the (uncommon) attempts to enforce
living wills. Such attempts are of two
kinds. First, people locked in a dispute
about treating an incompetent patient
can ask a court to settle the disagree-
ment. In doing so, the court can look at
the living will and any other relevant ev-
idence. Second, after a patient dies, the
family might sue to recover the damages
the patient suffered because the living
will was disobeyed. Why have courts
not embraced either kind of litigation?
In part, courts’ hesitation to enforce
living wills reflects a judicial aversion to
disputes about treating the dying. Such
disputes demand a speed courts can
rarely attain. The patient has often died
by the time lawyers have been consult-
ed, non-legal solutions have been ex-
hausted, a decision to litigate has been
reached, and legal documents and evi-
dence have been prepared. Just as bad is
the “standards” problem: These deci-
sions raise issues the law addresses too
obscurely to guide courts. And given
the complexity and perplexity of end-
of-life decisions, more illuminating
rules probably are impossible.
So courts have acquiesced—tacitly
and sometimes expressly—in relegating
these decisions to an informal process in
which doctors and families work toward
a consensus that the time has come to
let the patient die. Courts may be right
to do so: Evidence is spotty, but it hints
that patients’ families are generally satis-
fied with this process and that their dis-
satisfactions would not be soothed by
litigation.
But if the problem is speed, don’t liv-
ing wills solve it? If families can sue
physicians who have ignored living
wills, can’t families enforce living wills
simply by threatening to sue after the
patient died? Don’t doctors fear litiga-
tion so acutely that they will succumb
to mere menace?
In Duarte v. Chico Community Hos-
pital, the patient’s family brought such a
suit.3 Although the patient had no liv-
ing will, she had said emphatic things
while she was competent. Nevertheless,
the court rejected the suit because of a
California statute which said that even
if a surrogate appointed in a power of
attorney orders a physician to stop treat-
ment, the physician “is not subject to
criminal prosecution, civil liability, or
professional disciplinary action for fail-
ing to withdraw health care necessary to
keep the principal alive.”
Why? The law rarely pursues any
goal maximally. We want to reduce au-
tomobile pollution, but not so much
that we cripple car makers, or double
car prices, or take jobs from workers, or
walk to work. We don’t even do all we
could to eliminate crime, since we don’t
want to spend the money or live in a
police state. The law therefore rarely
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contemplates eliminating wrongdoing
and usually structures incentives to me-
diate among our conflicting goals.
That is presumably what California’s
legislature was doing. It obviously cher-
ished people’s right to refuse treatment;
it had recently passed a “Natural Death
Act” authorizing people to “execute at
any time a declaration governing the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment.” But it obviously
thought people’s lives should not be
ended improvidently, even if they are
very ill or even dying.
Thus the legislature presumably
wanted a structure of incentives that
would balance the pressures on people
making end-of-life decisions so that ac-
quiescing to anyone who wanted to
stop treatment would not be the course
of least resistance and greatest safety for
doctors. Perhaps the legislature did not
find the right balance, but it did find
the right method. A bane of law-mak-
ing is the irrepressible tendency to make
policy wholly in response to the latest
horror story—in our example, Dr. Kla-
van’s case. No legal regime will ever pre-
vent all bad results: the goal is the sys-
tem that prevents the fewest.
Not only does policy that reacts pri-
marily to horror stories swing madly
from one extreme to the other, but such
stories may better represent the past
than the future. Living wills are of their
time and place, a time and place in
which doctors seemed persistently and
gruesomely to overtreat dying patients:
“Although living wills are promoted as
tools to extend personal decision mak-
ing, from a practical standpoint they
encourage a particular type of choice:
the refusing of medical interventions
perceived to be invasive and valueless
near the end of life. . . . Nearly all living
wills now written prohibit such behav-
ior and attempt to prevent overtreat-
ment.”4
But if the issue is whether to enforce
living wills, we must ask not just what
problems afflicted the past, and not just
what problems attend the present, but
also what problems will infect the fu-
ture. There is mounting evidence that
overtreatment has abated markedly and
should continue to diminish, if only be-
cause doctors and hospitals have ever
fewer financial reasons to overtreat and
ever more to undertreat. One physician
puts the point vividly: “The medical
community that insisted on continuing
treatment of Karen Quinlan and Nancy
Cruzan petitioned the courts to stop
treatment of Helga Wanglie.”5 All this
makes it less urgent and even more haz-
ardous to make living wills easier to en-
force.
But aren’t the arguments against en-
forcement irrelevant if patients can tell
doctors, surrogates, and courts what
treatments they will want when incom-
petent? In particular, doesn’t the “stan-
dards” problem go away? Much de-
pends on whether you think living wills
dependably describe the decisions pa-
tients would have made. Here again the
issue is not whether anyone can ever
write a living will that captures the pa-
tient’s “real” preferences; the issue is
whether that happens often enough to
justify imposing liability on physicians.
On that issue, the case for skepticism is
convincing. As Angela Fagerlin and I
have argued, the empirical evidence
now compels us to doubt that (1) peo-
ple generally form sound and stable in-
tentions about future medical prefer-
ences, (2) people reliably articulate
those intentions accurately and compre-
hensibly, and (3) surrogates can ordi-
narily divine those intentions from the
living will.6
Crucially, patients themselves seem
so much to share these and other
doubts that in one study 54 percent of
the patients studied were willing to have
their surrogates override even a “per-
fect” living will.7 No court should want
to enforce a document whose authors
are so ambivalent and so likely not to
want the document to be binding.
Courts hesitate to enforce living wills
for yet another reason. When lawyers
think about liability, they ask what
damages the wrongdoer should pay the
victim. Thus in Anderson v. St. Francis-
St. George Hospital—a case about en-
forcing a DNR order the patient him-
self had requested—the Ohio Supreme
Court asked “what damages flow from
the ‘harm’ caused the plaintiff ” if an
order is ignored.8 The “harm” is that the
patient is alive. The court doubted that
life is a legal harm and that juries can
intelligently set a price on unwanted
life. The court concluded that “[t]here
are some mistakes, indeed even breach-
es of duty or technical assaults, that
people make in this life that affect the
lives of others for which there simply
should be no monetary compensation.”
This is what lawyers call a damnum
absque injuria, a “[l]oss, hurt, or harm
without injury in the legal sense, that is,
without such breach of duty as is re-
dressible by an action.”9 A suit to en-
force a living will is a sign that horrible
and irreconcilable differences polluted
efforts to make decisions for a patient.
It is unlikely that any such disaster can
be adjudicated post hoc in ways that
should make us comfortable assessing
liability. An imprecise but illuminating
analogy is no-fault divorce. Marriage
creates legal liabilities that can be adju-
dicable, but most states have decided
that fault is ordinarily distributed ob-
scurely enough, that evidence is ordi-
narily hard enough to obtain and ana-
lyze, and that litigation ordinarily is so
destructive that the legal rights marriage
creates have been left unenforceable. In
love and death alike, not all wrongs can
be righted, and yet fewer can be righted
by the law.
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